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Two ApPROACHES TO ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE:
AN ANALYSIS OF HEIDEGGERIAN AND DREYFUS IAN CRITIQUES
Nicholas K. Gracilla
Denison University
There exist two broad research paradigms in Artificial Intelli
gence (AI) which differ radically in their attempts to reproduce
human understanding through the use of computers. The dominant
paradigm. which I call Traditional AI, has focused on formalizing the
process of thinking into rules, symbols and representations of the
world. As such, its roots can be found in the philosophical traditions
of reductionism and rationalism. The second paradigm, which I call
Parallel Distributed Processing (PDP), has focused onusing comput
ers to emulate the neurological structure of the brain. Concerned less
with formalization than underlying computational structure, its
approach has developed from the neurosciences, Gestalt Theory and
work in perception. The short history of both paradigms is riddled
with fantastic claims and unsupported predictions of success. Hurbert
L. Dreyfus was one of the firs t to critically examine these claims-and
concluded that Traditional AI was fundamentally and irreparably
flawed in its approach. His criticisms, grounded in the works of
Martin Heidegger, make an in-principle argument against the pos
sibility of formalizing humanin telligent behavior. Traditional AI has
approached the formalization by postulating mental representa
tions, which both Dreyfus and Heidegger reject. Dreyfus' in-prin
ciple argument, however, holds no weight against the non-formal
ized, non-representational paradigm which PDP uses, and he is
notably less critical towards it because of this.
I believe his criticisms of Traditional AI are accurate. When
addressing the AI project in its entirety, however, his argument
appears to slip toward a different claim. He notes that, currently,
"human beings are much more holistic [than PDP networks] ," and in
emphasizing this holism, he suggests the minimal unit of analysis of
intelligent behavior mayan entire human-like organism in the entire
human culture (MVB, p. 39). Dreyfus' holism, which re-emphasizes
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"our needs, desires and emotions" as well as the importance of our"...
[having] a human-like body with appropriate physical movements,
abilities and vulnerability to injury" appears to permit only human
organisms to exhibit intelligent behavior (MVB, p. 39).
In this essay,lhope to show why Dreyfus' in-principle argument
correctly criticizes TraditionalAI, yetmay not address some inherent
characteristics of PDP architectures. 1 will also suggest that his
broader, holistic argument against AI in its entirety may not be
justified. My strategy will be to characterize both paradigms, em
phasizing their modes of representing information. I will review
Dreyfus' criticisms and their roots, as expanded in an analysis of
human understanding offered by Heidegger. 1 will show why the
critique is applicable to Traditional AI, yet inapplicable to PDP
systems. His transition to a holistic claim concerning intelligence will
then be evaluated, and hopefully shown to be untenable based on his
own arguments leveled against Traditional AI.
The computational paradigm used by Traditional AI approaches
has been described by Newell and Simon as a physical symbol
system. It can be characterized by its use of abstract symbols to
represent salient features in a "microworld"-an artificially con
structed problem domain which simulates a subset of the real world.
Syntactic rules manipulate these symbols to reflect the processes and
relations which occur in the microworld. The technique is powerful:
symbols and rules are capable of representing every fact and process
which can occur within the constraints of the explicitly defined
problem domain. It is questionable, however, whether a system
which uses this approach can replicate human intelligence.
Terry Winograd's SHRDLU-a Traditional AI program which
processed natural language sentences concerning a microworld of
blocks, spheres and pyramids-typifies two primary problems of
symbolic representation in microworlds. Within the restricted prob
lem domain, SHRDLU could correctly respond to questions or
commands such as "Can a pyramid be supported by a block?" and
"Find a block which is taller than the one you are holding and put it
into the box" (WeD, p. 7). Remarkable as this may seem, Dreyfus
points out-and Winograd readily admits-that nothing even ap
proaching an understanding of natural language is modeled in
SHRDLU. For example, in reference to "owning," Herbert A. Simon
remarks:
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... SHRDLU's test of whether something is owned is
simply whether it is tagged "owned." There is no
intensional test of ownership, hence SHRDLU knows
what it owns. but doesn't understand what it is to
own something (d.WCD, p.13).
SHRDLU cannot understand "what it is to own something" because
it is isolated from the context in which "owning" is meaningful.
Moreover, SHRDLU is incapable of understanding anything because
it is not "in" a context at all-its microworld contains only
uninterpreted facts concerning geometric objects and the relation
ships between them. A context which provides meaning, however,
does not consist of a body of uninterpreted facts and relations.
"Owning" is meaningful, for example, in a context of social interac
tions and property rights in which one participates.
This confusion between a meaningful context and the
uninterpreted facts which compose a microworld led Dreyfus to
reject the idea that microworlds are "worlds" at all.
A set of interrelated facts may constitute a universe, a
domain, a group, etc., but it does not constitute a
world, for a world is an organized body of objects,
purposes, skills and practices in terms of which hu
man activities have meaning or make sense (WCD, p.
13).
Thus, since the semantics of "owning" are context-sensitive to a
human world which SHRDLU is not in, the concept of "owning" is
meaningless to SHRDLU.
The second fundamental problem of Traditional AI typified by
SHRDLU concerns its method of knowledge representation.
SHRDLU's microworld consists of explicitly statable facts and rules
a kind of knowledge Gilbert Ryle calls "knowing that" (RyIe, p. 28).
Thus, SHRDLU can express "that a sphere is in the box" since this is
explicitly represented in its microworld. Yet, there is a qualitatively
different kind of knowledge which SHRDLU is incapable of repre
senting. Ryle calls this "knowing how"-a kind of knowledge which
indicates a skill or capability. For example, one might know how to
play Bach's preludes, how to swim or how to shoe a horse. Know
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how knowledge concerns an active doing, a performance, as opposed
to an explicitly stated fact or rule. Such knowledge is obtained
through learning from multiple experiences: one learns how to ride
a bike by continually getting on the saddle and pedaling.
This mode of acquisition reveals the qualitative difference be
tween the two knowledge types. One cannot explicitly articulate to
a child "how to balance" in any meaningful or helpful way. Learning
"how to balance" is not a process of studying and memorizing facts
concerning one's center of gravity, the effects of motion on objects
and so forth. Even after coming to know "how to balance," one
cannot easily articulate such facts. Dreyfus remarks "the fact that you
can't put what you have learned into words means that know-how
is not accessible to you in the form of facts and rules" (MOM, p. 16).
Since SHRDLU is designed as a physical symbol system, its micro
world necessarily consists of explicitly statable facts and ru1es. Thus,
any knowing-how one wishes SHRDLU to have access to must be
converted into knowing-that-a deeply problematic undertaking.
Considering the efforts made inAI during the 1970sand beyond,
it is dear that the criticisms concerning microworlds and the repre
sentation of knowing-how have become influential in Traditional AI
theorizing. New proposals, such as Minsky's frame system or Schank's
scripts, used complex representational structures in an attempt to
address these issues. Consider Schank and Abelson's script system:
A script is a structure that describes appropriate
sequences of events in a particular context. A script is
made up of slots and requirements about what can fill
those slots. The structure is an interconnected whole,
and what is in one slot affects what can be in another.
Scripts handle stylized everyday situations. They are
not subject to much change, nor do they provide the
apparatus for handling totally novel situations. 'Thus,
a script is a predetermined, stereotyped sequence of
actions that defines a well-known situation (Schank.
p.41).
.

Scripts attempt to enrich microworlds by representing human
world interactions, and attempt to capture the kind of common
sense know-how humans use in everyday situations. Schank cites
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the following short story as evidence of this: "John went to a restau
rant. He asked the waitress for coq au mn. He paid the check and left"
(Schank, p. 38). Human understanding embodies much more infor
mation than presented in the story: we understand that John ate the
coqaumn, for example, thathesatata table, ate the meal with utensils
and so on. Human knowledge of how one eats at arestaurant allows us
to understand this story in ways Traditional AI systems, which did
not model human practices or common-sense, could not. Do these
richer representational schemes offer any significant improvements ?
Scripts offer a significant advantage in their ability to use expec
tations, in the form of unfilled or default data slots. One such slot, for
example, could contain information about John's sitting position at
the table. Thus, if the story had an additional line, such as "When the
gun fired, John hit his knee on the table," the script could account for
John's unfortunate reflex by already having information concerning
his leg placement beneath the table.
We imagine that such a script, in order to handle the incredible
amount of information encountered in a restaurant, would be qui te
complex. Minsky, commenting on his frame system (similar in many
regards to a script) notes,
... the list [of facts] is not endless. It is only large, and
one needs a large set of concepts to organize it. After
a while one will find it getting harder to add new
concepts, and the new ones will begin to seem less
indispensable (WeD, p. 11).
Minsky's approach of decomposing the common-sense knowledge
of, say, "how to use a spoon" is characteristic of AI's information
processing model: the use of a spoon is a conglomeration of a huge
number of actions and rules-the degree of tension the fingers must
use to hold the spoon, the proper angle to hold the spoonso that food
will not slide off and so on.
Moreover, Jerry Fodor, another Traditional AI theorist, ques
tions the importance Ryle and Dreyfus place on the distinction
between knOWing-how and knowing-that. He remarks,
there is a real and important distinction between
knowing how to do a thing and knowing how to
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explainhow todothatthing. n. But what has this to do
with the relation between knowing how and know
ing that" (Fodor, p. 71)?
In refuting one's inability to articulate knowing-how as evidence of
a qualitatively different kind of knowledge, Fodor offers a distinc
tion between mental competences or skilled abilities and mental
traits-like intelligence or sensibility. Knowing-how to do some
thing is evidence of a competency, but not necessarily a trait like
intelligence. Moreover, traits like intelligence are not dependent on
competencies. By drawing this distinction, he suggests that,
if John is intelligent, there is no

specific activity he

need be good at ... being intelligent is not a matter of
doing something ... [since] "Being intelligent" and

"being stupid" do notname actions or types of actions
(Fodor, p. 72).
He suggests that knOWing-how appears to have the character of a
qualitatively different kind of knowledge only because humans have
no conscious access to it: we must, subconsciously, rapidly process
large amounts of knowing-that knowledge in every action and
ability. Thus, having larger amounts of information in richer repre
sentational schemes presumably addresses both problems of impov
erished microworlds and the representation of commonsense know
ing-how.
This technique, however, has met with serious difficulties. In the
attempt to "bolster" the information a script can contain, Traditional
AI theorists hope to work upwards from isolated, constrained prob
lem domains towards the world of human knowledge and experi
ence. Yet, at every tum, more and more information must be explic
it! y represented within the script. The magnitude of the project does
not go unnoticed; Minsky later (1975) comments:
Just constructing ~~ow ledge base is a major intellec
tual research problem .... We still know far too little
about the contents and structure of common-sense
knowledge. A "minimal" common-sense system must
"know" something aboutcause--effect, time, purpose,
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locality, process and types of knowledge ... (Minsky,
p.124).
An obvious solution would be to construct a machlne which
could move around in the world and learn to create its ownrepresen
tations. Yet this approach has encountered a serious paradox. Richer
knowledge representations require advances in robotic movement.
vision and interaction to learn from the environment: yet such
advances in robotics first require advances in knowledge represen
tations in such fundamental areas such as representing the robot's
ownbody, the solidity of objects, the effectsofmovement onperspec
tive and more (WeD, p. 46). Dreyfus does not consider enriched
representational schemes any kind of advance towards machine
understanding at all. The problem lies in an unjustified belief con
cerning human ability in the world: why would one consider, as
Minsky and Fodor do, the explicit representation of human practices
to be formalizable? This makes sense onIy in the context of the highl y
constrained microworld in which a program operates, and reveals
serious discrepancies between microworlds and the real world of
human experiences. Indeed, in ananalysis of the attempt to represent
the knowledge of even a small part of the world we live in, Dreyfus
concludes that microworlds are completely unlike the human expe
rience of the world. He suggests that we may work in subworlds,
such as the university or the theater, but they are not related to each
other in an isolated mode of "composing" a larger, shared world as
microworlds are. Human subworlds instead presuppose a larger
unified whole, and work as local elaborations of it (WeD, p. 14).
The attempt to gain machine understanding through enriched
representational schemes of the world has, so far, met with failure.
Yet Dreyfus' arguments have indicated an even deeper problem
with the approach: the question does not concern the degree of
complexity a representational scheme must have, but rather whethe r
human understanding involves representations at all. To further
develop this, I turn to Heidegger's analysis of human understand
ing.
Dreyfus' criticisms of AI's use of micro worlds, and his concern
for the humancontext in general, can clearly be traced to Heidegger' s
analysis of human existence (Dasein) Being-in the world. "Being-in"
conveys a sense of "in" entirely different from the way objects may
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be "in" other objects. A sphere, for example. may be "in a box" in the
sense thatit is surrounded on three or four sides; but this sense of "in"
is an unengaged one: the sphere, Heidegger says, is really "along
with" the box (Heidegger, p. 79). Humans, on the other hand, are
very different: we are engaged in the world; we dwell in a familiar
and involved way in it. Heidegger notes "there isno such thing as the
'side-by-sideness' of an entity called 'Dasein' with another entity
called 'world'" (Heidegger, p. 81) to emphasize that Being-in is not
like an "object inside an object." Indeed, the world is not a thing at all,
nor is it a composition of things. Instead, the world is a context, a
background for which entities have always already been in.
Entities in the world can be encountered by Dasein in two ways.
In use, an object is ready-to-hand (Heidegger, p. 98). Heidegger's
examples of ready-to-hand entities typically involve skilled activi
ties, such as hammering. The hammer, when actively used, is unno
ticed: "an entity of this kind is not grasped thematically as an occur
ring Thing" (Heidegger, p. 98). Thematic grasping of an entity qua
entity requires detached contemplation, a way of revealing objects as
present-at-hand. Thus, a hammer could be revealed as present-at
hand-if it is sitting on a table and Dasein is analytically examining
it, or if its head suddenly breaks when prying a nail and Dasein
attempts to repair it. But typically entities are known in their use, as
ready-to-hand.
The distinction between use and detached contemplation clearly
corresponds to the distinction between knowing-how and know
ing-that. Heidegger's analysis, which shows that Dasein is always
in-the-world, sets the ready-to-hand encountering of entities as the
fundamental, typical way Dasein understands. This understanding
is knowing-how-encountering an entity as ready-to-hand in its
use. Revealing an entity as present-at-hand in detached contempla
tion yields an entity qua entity. This is knowledge of the knowing
that sort. concerning facts and information about objects distinct
from Dasein. Thus Dreyfus notes that Being-m-the-world cannot be
understood solely on the model of a relationship belween subject
and object, because such amodel dpes not account for understanding
a thing as ready-ta-hand (BW. p. 45). Heidegger, also refuting the
subject/object model of understanding. insists that "... the perceiv
ing of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty
to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped
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it ..." (Heidegger, p. 89). He refutes the traditional representational
theory of mind, which hold that we form meaningful mental repre
sentations of the world and manipulate them when thinking.
Heidegger does not deny the possibility of mental phenomena: he
does, however, reject the idea that such phenomena create "internal
meanings" of the world.
Traditional AI has had, as its primary focus, an analysis of the
way humans-as-subjects "grasp" objects in the world and interpret
them in an internal, mental sphere. This is the attempt to analyze
understanding as a collection of knowing-that knowledge. But this
"knowing" is only knowing the present-at-hand: it involves sym
bolic representations of the world and the rules needed to meaning
fully manipulate them. It completely neglects understanding as
primarily understanding entities as ready-to-hand. Fodor's earlier
argument that intelligence is not a skill like hammering makes this
fundamental mistake. This is the attempt to formalize understand
ing as something distinct from the way Dasein is in-the-world-an
impossible project, since the world revealed ready-to-hand cannot
be represented by a set of context-free elements. The use of a
hammer, for example, is nested in the context of a human social
world with purposes and roles, which need not be represented as a
set of facts (MVB, p. 29).
Formalizing understanding to gain commonsense knowledge is
at an impasse because Heidegger's commonsense understanding
everyday know-how-does not consist of procedural rules, but
rather an unformalizable knowing-what-to-do in everyday situa
tions (MVB, p. 33). Dreyfus suggests that a child comes to know
what-to-do by constant exposure to the world, and that "the same
might well be the case for the social world. If background under
standing is indeed a skill and if skills are based on whole patterns and
not on rules, we would expect symbolic representations to fail to
capture our commonsense understanding" (MVB, p. 33).
The Heideggedan perspective provides a useful background to
Dreyfus' criticisms of Traditional AI. The danger, however, lies in
the ease at which one can overemphasize the holistic nature of
human understanding. That "one cannot build up the phenomenon
of world out of meaningless elements" (BW, p. 119) does not neces
sarily imply that human understanding is dependent on the entire
human culture, as Dreyfus does. To show this, I will first show how

38

NICHOLAS K. GRACILLA

the PDP app roach to AI satisfies Heidegger' s and Dreyfus' criticisms
of Traditional AI, and then critically examine Dreyfus' "wholer than
holism" criticisms.
In theirmost general case, PDP systems are simulations of neural
networks found in the brain. They consist of large numbers of
individual processing units connected together in varying degrees of
complexity. Individual units typically perform simple computa
tions; they process information by sending excitatory or inhibitory
signals to other units in varying degrees of intensity, dependent
entirely upon the signals of the units simultaneously connected to
them. Such a network will have two primary edges of multiple
connection lines: the first can be considered as an input edge, where
received information can pass through the network of connections
and computation units to an output edge.
A PDP network is not programmed with explicit rules nor does
it create representations of the world to manipulate. Instead, a
network is repeatedly exposed to "input" information concerning
the world and "output" expected responses. By adjusting its internal
connections, the networ k learns to associate the expected response to
the situation. For example, one might "train" a network to predict
weather patterns by presenting facts about the current weather
conditions and what followed from them. The trained network could
then associate similar future conditions to what had happened. More
importantly, since there are no explicit rules concerning barometl'ic
pressures, wind patterns, etc., the network can generalize to new
conditions based on past experience. Salient features of new experi
ences can be associated with past experiences, allowing for re
sponses to conditions which the network had not seen before.
The method of knowledge retention, too. is non-explicit and
non-representational. Note well that Heidegger does not deny inter
nal psychical entities or mental states-he merely denies that they
are "internal meanings" or representations. The same holds true for
PDP connectionist networks. In the context of weather recognition,
the value of an individual node at some position is meaningless. No
individual or group of nodes "represent" a rule which might state "if
the barometric pressure is high, it is likely to be a nice day," nor is the
value of some individual processing unit a meaningful representa
tion of a feature in the world.
Indeed, a trained network is only meaningful when considered
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as a whole in the context of the world. Its internal adjustments, are
entirely dependent on the infonnation presented. No previously
structured system akin to a script is used to deconstruct and process
particular salient features of the problem. Instead, problem situa
tions are presented to the networ k, which independently determines
which are, and which are not, useful features.
PDP networks are consistent with Dreyfus' and Heidegger's
accounts in several ways. First and foremost, they do not create
internal representations in the spirit of a representational theory of
mind. Activity certainly occurs between nodes, but this activity
cannot be meaningfully related to external phenomena. An indi
vidual node's value is meaningful only in the context of the entire
network. Secondly, the network is not independent of the context of
the situation. Its only rule-which might be stated as "adjust to suit
the expected response"-is entirely dependent on the information
presented as well as the expected response. Any rule-like behavior
which a network appears to follow can not be the result of the
formation of rules, since rules cannot be represented in the network.
Such behavior must be said to be emergent: a complex activity gained
through the interaction of processing units which are not explicitly
concerned with the more complex overall goal (Wallich, p. 128). The
problem of machine representations of knowing-how appears to be
readily addressed by the emergent quality of PDP systems. Just as,
for humans, the acquisition of such knowledge requires repeated
practice and development, parallel acquisition in connectionist sys
tems require repeated training sessions.
Dreyfus recognizes the compatibility of PDP systems with his
and Heidegger's in-principle pOSition concerning knowing-how
representations and Being-in-the-World. Yet Dreyfus is still critical
of network systems. He comments "Intelligent behaviol' requires as
a background the totality of practices whichmake up the human way
. of Being in the world ... [yet] the capability for providing such a
background is, at present, beyond the horizon" (FMK, p. 132) and" ...
human beings are much. more holistic than neural nets. Intelligence
has to be motivated by purposes inthe organism and goals picked up
by the organism from an ongoing culture" (MVB, p. 39).
It is this increasing dependence on an argument based on more
and more holism which I find incompatible with his earlier, consis
tent views. We say of a child, who clearly has not gained the "totality
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of practices which make up the human way of Being in the world,"
that she is still intelligent despite this deficiency. On D:ceyfus' ac
count, at what point could we determine that a person was intelli
gent? How many human social practices would one have to know?
It would be absurd to think that traveling to a country whose social
practices were not known in their entirety would render a person
unintelligent.
Increased holism appears to be a quantitative argument. Yet
Dreyfus refuted Traditional AI's attempt to use a similar argument.
At that point, the Traditional AI approach was to include more and
more information into highly structured representational systems.
Dreyfus had shown that the quantity of information a Traditional AI
system had was irrelevant: its representations had no know ledge of
the ready-to-hand. Yet now that PDP systems meet such criteria,
Dreyfus reverts to the quantitative argument he refuted: a PDP
system must now have access to an entire human culture, with
innumerable goals and purposes.
I donot believe that PDP systems are the final answer to the many
questions involved in modeling human intelligence. Yet I have
shown the significant advances they do offer: networks are capable
of exhibiting the non-formalizable behavior both Dreyfus and I
believe are vital to human understanding. This capability renders
Dreyfus' in-principle argument against them inapplicable.
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